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Climate change will not affect all parts of the world equally, but will instead have a disproportionate impact
on specific geographical areas and populations. Marcus Hedahl writes that underlying social
structures amplify this disparity, with the actors most responsible for causing climate change also
possessing the greatest ability to mitigate its effects. He argues that those who are at most risk from
climate change must be allowed to participate fully in global decision-making processes: not only
because there is a moral obligation to do so, but also because they have unique knowledge of the
local effects which will impact upon their communities.
Our ancestors burned through massive quantities of fossil fuels in utter insouciance, but we now
know that our actions, policies, institutions, and even moral attitudes must change. Such changes will require more
than a mere reexamination of prudence, for those most likely to exacerbate and perpetuate the problem of climate
change are least likely to suffer its most adverse effects. These changes must also encompass more than a
rededication to charity, for we are not innocent Samaritans who happen upon strangers in need. Each of us is at
least as much robber as Samaritan, for it is our own actions and inactions that are causing very real and grievously
wrongful effects. In considering the harms of man-made climate change, therefore, the old and familar requirements
of justice will place a number of new and significant obligations upon us.
Man-made climate change also significantly
exacerbates existing distributional injustices. A
geographical unevenness is found in the way climate
change affects different parts of the world, with many
developing countries most vulnerable to the most
adverse consequentces. Yet the disparity in climate
change burdens will not be reducible to accidents of
geography. It will not be merely an unfortunate
coincidence that those most likely to suffer the worst
effects of climate change are those who are least likely
to perpetuate the problem. The very same underlying
social structures that lead to some bearing a greater
causal responsibility for climate change will lead to
them being better able to mitigate and adapt to the
harms climate change poses.
The legitimate demands of those wronged by man-
made climate change thereby follow a familiar legal
and social pattern. Claims of rights and justice are
often advanced as demands against the status quo, a
fundamental challenge to an existing system of
entrenched social practices, rather than merely a complaint about a specific act of exploitation or unjust treatment.
We should – no doubt – lobby for reform, work to overthrow the current system, and strive to make our collective
practices more just.
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Unfortunately, however, we remain in a morally fractured world, without reform, collective agreement, or justice. The
current system lurches forward, as do the aggregate and devastating consequences of our actions and our
inactions. The interplay of the morally required and the politically feasible thereby requires much more than doing
the best that we can; each successive action or inaction influences our future moral and legal culpability.
In such a world, the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes becomes particularly normatively
important: the voices of the most vulnerable to climate change must be heard and heeded. Significantly, this
requirement does not stem solely from the fact that those most vulnerable have a unique access to knowledge of the
particular local impacts. Those harmed by climate change also possess the authority to play a distinctive role in how
obligations get shaped and specified, especially in non-ideal conditions in which some demands of justice are likely
to be less than fully fulfilled.
If we recognise the significance of this authority, we can see that our failure to set up a system to meet basic rights
does not merely wrong those injured by climate change by failing to prevent those harms, it further wrongs them
because they have no one to demand what is rightfully their due. So, even if one is skeptical of the efficiency of such
an institutional order, or even if one believes much more radical, systemic, and even revolutionary measures are
required in order to prevent the injustices of climate change, there are nonetheless significant normative reasons to
support institutional structures to allow those vulnerable to the harms of climate change the opportunity to participate
in decision-making processes which are fair, accountable, open, and free of corruption.
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